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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 In these consolidated antitrust conspiracy cases, two 
groups of plaintiffs, one a certified class of direct purchasers 
of chocolate products (“the Direct Purchaser Class”), and the 
other a group of individual plaintiffs (“the Individual 
Plaintiffs”) (collectively, “the Plaintiffs”), appeal the District 
Court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants The 
Hershey Company (“Hershey”); Hershey Canada, Inc.; Nestlé 
USA, Inc.; and Mars, Inc. and Mars Snackfood U.S., LLC 
(collectively, “Mars”) (all appellees are collectively referred 
to as “the Chocolate Manufacturers”).  
 According to the Plaintiffs, the Chocolate 
Manufacturers conspired to raise prices on chocolate candy 
products in the United States three times between 2002 and 
2007. The Plaintiffs assert numerous errors on appeal, but at 
its core, this case is about how courts should view evidence of 
a contemporaneous antitrust conspiracy in a foreign market 
when that evidence is offered to prove the existence of an 
antitrust conspiracy in the U.S. market. Here the foreign 
conspiracy involved the Chocolate Manufacturers’ Canadian 
brethren: Hershey Canada,1 Mars Canada, Inc., and Nestlé 
Canada (collectively, “the Canadian Chocolate 
Manufacturers”), as well as others.  
 We agree with the District Court that the Canadian 
conspiracy evidence is ambiguous and does not support an 
                                              
1 Hershey Canada is the only one of the Canadian 
Chocolate Manufacturers that is a party to this appeal.  
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inference of a U.S. conspiracy for two simple reasons. First, 
the people involved in and the circumstances surrounding the 
Canadian conspiracy are different from those involved in and 
surrounding the purported U.S. conspiracy, and second, the 
evidence that the Chocolate Manufacturers in the United 
States knew of the unlawful Canadian conspiracy is weak 
and, in any event, relates only to Hershey. Because we also 
conclude that the Plaintiffs’ other traditional conspiracy 
evidence is insufficient to create a reasonable inference of a 
U.S. price-fixing conspiracy, we will affirm.2  
I. 
A. The U.S. Chocolate Industry  
 The U.S. chocolate confectionary market is dominated 
by three companies: Hershey, Mars, and Nestlé USA. 
Hershey is a publicly traded company based in Hershey, 
Pennsylvania, and sells such famous brands as Hershey’s 
Milk Chocolate Bar and Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups. Mars is 
a privately held company headquartered in Virginia and is the 
parent company of Mars Snackfood U.S. Among Mars’s most 
notable brands are M&Ms and Milky Way. Nestlé USA is a 
U.S.-based company wholly owned by Switzerland-based 
Nestlé S.A. Nestlé USA sells such popular brands as Nestlé 
Crunch and Butterfinger. Besides offering a variety of 
chocolate candy brands, the Chocolate Manufacturers offer a 
variety of sizes. Some sizes, such as single- and king-size 
                                              
 2 Because we conclude that the District Court correctly 
granted summary judgment for the Chocolate Manufacturers, 
we do not reach the secondary question of whether the 
District Court abused its discretion by excluding a portion of 
the Individual Plaintiffs’ economic expert’s report calculating 
the damages caused by Nestlé USA.  
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bars (“singles” and “kings”), are for immediate consumption, 
while others, including bags containing miniature or bite-size 
candies, are for future consumption. This case focuses on 
immediate consumption candy sizes. 
 The U.S. chocolate market is highly concentrated. 
During the relevant period, these three companies controlled 
more than 75% of the U.S. market, with Hershey controlling 
approximately 42%, Mars controlling approximately 28%, 
and Nestlé USA controlling roughly 8%. 
 The primary raw materials for the various chocolate 
products at issue are generally the same: cocoa, sugar, dairy 
products, peanuts, almonds, fats, and oils. Naturally, the costs 
of these ingredients affect the prices of the chocolate 
products. To hedge against cost increases for these 
ingredients, the Chocolate Manufacturers take advantage of 
futures exchanges. For example, in a 2002 internal report, 
Hershey understood that through futures contracts, its 
coverage on cocoa costs “through mid-2004” was “favorable 
versus [its] principal competitors.” J.A. 4620. Still, between 
2002 and 2007, it is undisputed that cocoa prices increased. 
See J.A. 6273–74 (acknowledging that Hershey’s actual 
cocoa costs increased from 2002 to 2006). 
 Parallel price increases—in which one company raises 
prices and its rivals follow—are not uncommon in this 
industry. Although the price increases have not followed a 
consistent playbook—some have involved changes in candy 
weight while others have involved delays between the initial 
and subsequent pricing actions—the Chocolate Manufacturers 
raised prices together in 1979, 1981, 1984, 1986, 1991, and 
1995.  
 
 B. The Purported U.S. Conspiracy 
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 According to the Plaintiffs, the Chocolate 
Manufacturers conspired to raise U.S. list prices on chocolate 
candy products three times between 2002 and 2007. On 
December 7, 2002, following a seven-year period of stagnant 
prices, Mars announced list price increases on singles and six 
packs by 3.5 cents per bar effective December 9, 2002. On 
December 9, Hershey announced an identical price increase 
on singles and a slightly lesser price increase on six packs; in 
addition, Hershey announced price increases on kings and ten 
packs (all effective January 2003). On December 11, Nestlé 
USA’s prices moved too, effectively matching Mars and 
Hershey’s price increases on singles, Hershey’s price increase 
on kings, and Mars’s greater price increase on six packs. 
Days later, Mars matched Hershey’s increase on kings and 
exceeded Hershey’s increase on ten packs.  
 Next, in November 2004, Mars initiated another price 
increase, this time on future consumption products. Nearly 
one month later, Hershey followed Mars’s price increase on 
future consumption products and also raised prices on singles, 
kings, and six packs. Soon after, Mars matched Hershey’s 
increases. Nestlé USA followed with nearly identical 
increases several days later. Finally, on March 23, 2007, Mars 
initiated the final increase during the alleged conspiracy 
period when it increased prices on singles and kings. Hershey 
matched the increases on April 4, and Nestlé USA followed 
the next day. 
 The conspiracy was furthered, the Plaintiffs argue, by 
the Chocolate Manufacturers exchanging information on each 
other’s planned price increases before publicly announcing 
those increases. For example, an internal Hershey document 
shows that Hershey had information as early as September 
2002 that Mars was “considering a price increase due to 
rising cocoa costs,” J.A. 5300, and in announcing the 2002 
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Mars price increase to the Hershey board of directors, 
Hershey’s CEO, Rick Lenny, characterized the Mars increase 
as “roughly in line with expectations,” J.A. 4620.  
 In addition, the Plaintiffs highlight various 
opportunities the Chocolate Manufacturers had to conspire. 
For example, in 2002, at a time when the U.S. chocolate 
market was not thriving, the Hershey Trust, Hershey’s 
controlling shareholder, put Hershey up for sale. Hershey’s 
rivals, including Nestlé and Cadbury, were among the 
interested buyers. Through the proposed sale process, Nestlé 
and Cadbury obtained information about Hershey’s business, 
but the record is unclear to what extent Hershey’s most 
sensitive information, such as commodities cost coverage, 
changed hands and who received it. The Hershey Trust 
terminated the sale process in September 2002, shortly before 
the first price increase in the purported conspiracy. 
 The Plaintiffs also point north to Canada, where the 
Canadian chocolate market was embroiled in its own antitrust 
conspiracy at the same time as the purported U.S. conspiracy. 
Like the U.S. market, the Canadian market is very 
concentrated, with the three Canadian Chocolate 
Manufacturers controlling roughly 66% of the market. 
Hershey is the parent company of Hershey Canada, and Mars 
is the parent company of Mars Canada. Hershey Canada and 
Mars Canada report to and need final approval from U.S.-
based executives on pricing decisions, but the Canadian 
subsidiaries are separate legal entities, operate exclusively in 
Canada, and run their own day-to-day operations. Nestlé 
Canada, on the other hand, is a subsidiary of Switzerland-
based Nestlé S.A., so it is different from Hershey Canada and 
Mars Canada in that it does not report to a U.S. parent 
company.  
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 From 2002 to 2007, Mars Canada, Hershey Canada, 
Nestlé Canada, and Cadbury Adams Canada (“Cadbury 
Canada”) allegedly conspired to limit competition on trade 
spend3 and to raise prices. The trade spend conspiracy began 
in 2002 when ITWAL, a direct purchaser and major 
distributor in Canada, sent notices to the Canadian Chocolate 
Manufacturers asking them to reign in trade spend. ITWAL’s 
efforts were successful, yielding commitments from the 
Canadian Chocolate Manufacturers that they would reduce 
trade spend. In April 2002, ITWAL’s president sent a notice 
to each of the Canadian Chocolate Manufacturers stating, 
“[I]t appears your efforts to ‘dry up’ this activity may be 
starting to work!” J.A. 7128. Driving home the point, 
ITWAL’s president sent another notice in December of that 
year to all the Canadian Chocolate Manufacturers stating, “I 
WOULD LIKE TO EXTEND CONGRATULATIONS TO 
YOU ALL AS WE WIND UP THE YEAR WITH RESPECT 
TO YOUR CONCERTED AND COMMITTED EFFORTS 
TO CLEAN UP THE DYSFUNCTIONAL RETAIL TRADE 
SPENDING.” J.A. 7157 (emphasis added). 
 Additionally, there is evidence suggesting a price-
fixing conspiracy among the Canadian Chocolate 
Manufacturers, including secret meetings involving pricing 
discussions. In 2005, for example, Nestlé Canada CEO Bob 
Leonidas told Cadbury Canada President David Sculthorpe 
that Nestlé Canada would be increasing prices and proved it 
with a copy of a not-yet-issued price-increase announcement, 
                                              
3 Trade spend refers to rebates, allowances, discounts, 
and promotions that manufacturers individually negotiate 
with retailers that effectively lower the price that the customer 
pays.   
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and Sculthorpe promised that Cadbury Canada would follow. 
J.A. 11817–19. 
 The Canadian scheme was ultimately the subject of a 
criminal investigation by the Canadian Competition Bureau. 
Cadbury Canada cooperated with the investigation, and 
Hershey Canada did as well, with Hershey pleading guilty to 
one count of price fixing stemming from a 2007 incident and 
paying a $4 million (Canadian) fine. J.A. 13564–65. In 2013, 
Nestlé Canada, Mars Canada, ITWAL, Leonidas, and 
ITWAL’s president were indicted in Canada. The Canadian 
case is still pending.  
 C. The Procedural History 
 The cases on appeal have a long history. They began 
as ninety-one separate civil actions that were filed against the 
Chocolate Manufacturers as well as their Canadian 
counterparts and several Cadbury entities. In addition to 
various state law claims, the actions brought claims under §§ 
4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26, alleging 
that the defendants engaged in a U.S. price-fixing conspiracy 
in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. In 
2008, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
consolidated the actions for pretrial proceedings in the U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). 
 After the cases were consolidated, each of the 
defendants moved to dismiss the complaints for failure to 
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but on March 4, 2009, the District Court denied 
the motions except as to certain state law claims. See In re 
Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d 
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538, 548–49 (M.D. Pa. 2009).4 At the pleading stage, the 
District Court decided that the Plaintiffs had adequately pled 
a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act. In 
so holding, the District Court relied on allegations regarding 
the contemporaneous Canadian conspiracy and the Canadian 
chocolate market’s integration with the U.S. chocolate 
market. Id. at 576–77. In 2011, all the Cadbury defendants 
were dismissed after they reached a settlement with the 
various groups of plaintiffs. As part of the agreement with the 
Direct Purchaser Class, Cadbury agreed to fully cooperate 
with the Plaintiffs during discovery. J.A. 2642. 
 On December 7, 2012, the District Court certified a 
class of all direct purchasers of chocolate candy products for 
resale from the Chocolate Manufacturers between December 
9, 2002 and December 20, 2007, which formed the Direct 
Purchaser Class. The Individual Plaintiffs, comprising mostly 
grocery and drug stores, pursued their claims individually. In 
certifying the Direct Purchaser Class, the District Court 
denied Daubert5 challenges to the Class’s economic experts, 
Dr. Robert D. Tollison and Dr. James T. McClave. In re 
Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 289 F.R.D. 200, 213 
(M.D. Pa. 2012). Briefly, Dr. Tollison opined that the U.S. 
chocolate market was conducive to price fixing and that a 
price-fixing conspiracy did occur in this case, while Dr. 
                                              
4 Several defendants also moved to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). After initially 
deferring ruling on these motions, the District Court 
ultimately granted the motions as to Mars Canada, Nestlé 
S.A., and Nestlé Canada. See In re Chocolate Confectionary 
Antitrust Litig., 641 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373 (M.D. Pa. 2009). 
5 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993).  
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McClave testified to the class-wide damages caused by the 
Chocolate Manufacturers’ supracompetitive prices.   
 In May 2013, the District Court considered another 
Daubert motion, this time challenging the testimony of the 
Individual Plaintiffs’ economic expert, Dr. Christopher A. 
Vellturo. The District Court granted the motion to exclude 
part of Dr. Vellturo’s testimony and reports on the Individual 
Plaintiffs’ damages caused by Nestlé USA’s alleged 
overcharges because Dr. Vellturo based his calculations on 
Mars’s profit margin data, not Nestlé USA’s. The Individual 
Plaintiffs appeal that decision here.6 As for the remainder of 
Dr. Vellturo’s testimony, the District Court denied the 
Daubert motion, concluding that Dr. Vellturo’s other 
opinions, including his opinion that the Canadian conspiracy 
facilitated or “actuated” the implementation of the U.S. 
conspiracy, were admissible. J.A. 100–03. 
 At the close of discovery, each of the Chocolate 
Manufacturers filed separate summary judgment motions as 
to the Individual Plaintiffs’ claims and the Direct Purchaser 
Class’s claims. On February 26, 2014, the District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Chocolate 
Manufacturers. See In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust 
Litig., 999 F. Supp. 2d 777, 780 (M.D. Pa. 2014). The 
Plaintiffs’ claims failed, the District Court reasoned, because 
they could not show that the Chocolate Manufacturers acted 
against their self-interest and because there was no traditional 
conspiracy evidence. In the District Court’s view, the 
Plaintiffs’ evidence was as consistent with lawful competition 
as with an illegal conspiracy and therefore could not raise a 
                                              
6 As explained earlier, we do not reach this issue 
because we will affirm the District Court’s summary 
judgment. See supra note 2. 
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reasonable inference of a price-fixing conspiracy. Id. at 805. 
This decision is the central issue on appeal.  
 The Plaintiffs filed timely appeals.  
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 
15(a) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s summary judgment and apply the same 
standard the District Court did. In re Baby Food Antitrust 
Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 123–24 (3d Cir. 1999).  
 Because substantive antitrust law is intertwined with 
our standard of review, we first discuss the underlying legal 
principles. The Plaintiffs’ claims arise from § 1 of the 
Sherman Act, which prohibits “[e]very contract, combination 
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. Although its language is 
broad, § 1 only prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade. In 
re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 
2004). Therefore, in some cases, courts must apply “the so-
called rule of reason,” a case-by-case inquiry designed to 
assess whether challenged conduct is an anticompetitive 
practice. Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 118.  
 Other restraints of trade, however, have such little 
redeeming competitive value that they are deemed per se 
unreasonable. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 
300, 316 (3d Cir. 2010). Horizontal price fixing among 
competitors—what the Plaintiffs claim happened here—is a 
classic example of a restraint of trade analyzed under the per 
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se standard.7 Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006). 
Price-fixing agreements “are all banned because of their 
actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the 
economy.” United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 
150, 224 n.59 (1940).  
 In per se cases like this one, “the plaintiff need only 
prove that the defendants conspired among each other and 
that this conspiracy was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s 
injury.” InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 159 
(3d Cir. 2003). Without proof of concerted action, the 
plaintiff’s claim fails because the “very essence of a section 1 
claim . . . is the existence of an agreement.” Alvord-Polk, Inc. 
v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 999 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Therefore, proof of a “unity of purpose or a common design 
and understanding or a meeting of minds in an unlawful 
arrangement” is required. Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Such proof may come in the form of direct 
evidence, e.g., an explicit admission from a participant that an 
antitrust conspiracy existed, or circumstantial evidence. 
InterVest, 340 F.3d at 159. An important corollary to the 
agreement requirement is that § 1 liability cannot be 
predicated on a defendant’s unilateral actions, no matter its 
anticompetitive motivations. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite 
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (“Independent action is 
not proscribed [by § 1].”); InterVest, 340 F.3d at 159.  
 Returning to our standard of review, the summary 
judgment standard in antitrust cases is generally no different 
from the standard in other cases. Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 357. 
Here as elsewhere, summary judgment is appropriate when 
                                              
7 A horizontal price-fixing agreement occurs when 
competitors on the same market level agree to fix or control 
prices for their goods or services.  
  18 
 
the evidence “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We also review the 
record as a whole and in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant, drawing reasonable inferences in its favor. See 
Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 357.  
 There is, however, “an important distinction” in 
antitrust cases. Id. “[A]ntitrust law limits the range of 
permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a § 1 
case.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 588 (1986). “[C]onduct as consistent with 
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, 
standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy.” 
Id. Therefore, unless the plaintiff “present[s] evidence ‘that 
tends to exclude the possibility’ that the alleged conspirators 
acted independently,” summary judgment is appropriate. Id. 
(quoting Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764). The purpose of this 
standard is to avoid mistaken inferences that could impose 
liability for lawful conduct and, consequently, “chill the very 
conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.” Id. at 594; 
accord Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 357. 
 Under Matsushita, the range of acceptable inferences 
that may be drawn from ambiguous or circumstantial 
evidence “‘var[ies] with the plausibility of the plaintiffs’ 
theory and the dangers associated with such inferences.’” Flat 
Glass, 385 F.3d at 357 (quoting Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, 
Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
If the plaintiff’s theory “makes no economic sense” and if 
drawing inferences in its favor would deter procompetitive 
conduct, the plaintiff must produce “more persuasive 
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evidence” to support its claim. Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).8  
 Importantly, even when armed with a plausible 
economic theory, a plaintiff relying on ambiguous evidence 
alone cannot raise a reasonable inference of a conspiracy 
sufficient to survive summary judgment. Matsushita, 475 
U.S. at 597 n.21 (“We do not imply that, if petitioners had 
had a plausible reason to conspire, ambiguous conduct could 
suffice to create a triable issue of conspiracy.”); Rossi v. 
Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 466 (3d Cir. 1998). At 
the same time, “defendants are [not] entitled to summary 
judgment merely by showing that there is a plausible 
explanation for their conduct; rather the focus must remain on 
the evidence proffered by the plaintiff and whether that 
evidence tends to exclude the possibility that the defendants 
                                              
8 We illustrated the point well in Flat Glass by 
comparing the theories involved in Matsushita and Petruzzi’s, 
see 385 F.3d at 358, and we summarize that discussion here. 
In Matsushita, the Supreme Court criticized the alleged multi-
firm, predatory pricing scheme as inherently “speculative,” so 
the Court refused to draw an inference of a conspiracy from 
ambiguous evidence. See 475 U.S. at 588–91, 597–98. In 
Petruzzi’s, by contrast, we drew more liberal inferences in the 
plaintiff’s favor because the plaintiff’s theory—that the 
defendants conspired not to compete with each other on 
existing customer accounts—made “perfect economic sense.” 
998 F.2d at 1232. The only way for the defendants in 
Petruzzi’s to increase profits in this manner was by 
agreement. Moreover, this conduct of refusing to compete 
was obviously not procompetitive. Id. 
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were acting independently.” Rossi, 156 F.3d at 467 (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted).9  
III. 
 The Plaintiffs build their case on a logical enough 
foundation: three parallel price increases by the Chocolate 
Manufacturers between 2002 and 2007. Moreover, the 
Plaintiffs’ theory—that the Chocolate Manufacturers 
conspired to fix prices at supracompetitive levels—“makes 
perfect economic sense.” Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 358. If true, 
the alleged conduct is also not procompetitive. Id. But despite 
the facial plausibility of the Plaintiffs’ theory and the 
circumstantial evidence supporting it, we must be cautious. 
The U.S. chocolate market is “a textbook example of an 
oligopoly,”10 J.A. 2187, and we cannot infer too much from 
mere evidence of parallel pricing among oligopolists, Flat 
Glass, 385 F.3d at 358.  
 Our caution is based on the economic theory of 
interdependence, which recognizes the differences between 
                                              
 9 The “strictures of Matsushita d[o] not apply” when 
plaintiffs use direct evidence to prove a conspiracy because 
“no inferences are required from direct evidence to establish a 
fact,” thus negating any concern about the reasonableness of 
the inferences drawn from that evidence. Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d 
at 1233. Nor are these concerns implicated when there is 
“strong circumstantial evidence” because such evidence is 
“sufficiently unambiguous.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
10 An oligopoly is a market “in which a few relatively 
large sellers account for the bulk of the output.” 2B Phillip E. 
Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 404a, at 10 
(4th ed. 2014). 
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competitive markets (markets with many smaller firms) and 
oligopolistic markets (concentrated markets with only a few 
firms). In competitive markets, the theory goes, any one 
firm’s change in output or price would go unnoticed by its 
competitors because the effects of that firm’s increased sales 
“would be so diffused among its numerous competitors.” Id. 
at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted). In a concentrated 
or oligopolistic market, by contrast, a single firm’s change in 
output or price “will have a noticeable impact on the market 
and on its rivals.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Therefore, the theory of interdependence posits that “any 
rational decision [by an oligopolist] must take into account 
the anticipated reaction of the other firms.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted). The upshot is 
oligopolists may maintain supracompetitive prices through 
rational, interdependent decision-making, as opposed to 
unlawful concerted action, if the oligopolists independently 
conclude that the industry as a whole would be better off by 
raising prices. Id.  
 Even though this practice of parallel pricing, known as 
“conscious parallelism,” produces anticompetitive outcomes, 
it is lawful under the Sherman Act for two reasons. Id. at 
359–60. First, conscious parallelism is not an agreement, id. 
at 360; instead, it “can be a necessary fact of life” in 
oligopolies, Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 122. Second, conscious 
parallelism is lawful not because it “is desirable (it is not),” 
but because courts have no effective remedy for the problem. 
Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 
484 (1st Cir. 1988) (Breyer, J.); accord Flat Glass, 385 F.3d 
at 360. 
 Accordingly, evidence of conscious parallelism cannot 
alone create a reasonable inference of a conspiracy. Baby 
Food, 166 F.3d at 122. To move the ball across the goal line, 
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a plaintiff must also show that certain plus factors are present. 
Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360. Plus factors are “proxies for 
direct evidence” because they “tend[] to ensure that courts 
punish concerted action—an actual agreement—instead of the 
unilateral, independent conduct of competitors.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Although we have not identified an 
exhaustive list of plus factors, they may include “(1) evidence 
that the defendant had a motive to enter into a price fixing 
conspiracy; (2) evidence that the defendant acted contrary to 
its interests; and (3) ‘evidence implying a traditional 
conspiracy.’” Id. (quoting Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1244).  
 Yet in cases alleging parallel price increases, as 
opposed to some other form of concerted action, “the first two 
factors largely restate the phenomenon of interdependence.” 
Id.; see also Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1244 (acknowledging that 
evidence of actions against self-interest may overlap with 
lawful interdependence in parallel pricing cases, but 
concluding that the overlap concern is absent when the 
challenged conduct involves parallel non-pricing decisions). 
Evidence of a motive to conspire means the market is 
conducive to price fixing, and evidence of actions against 
self-interest means there is evidence of behavior inconsistent 
with a competitive market. See Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360–
61. By nature, oligopolistic markets are conducive to price 
fixing and will often exhibit behavior that would not be 
expected in competitive markets. Id. Therefore, these factors 
are neither necessary nor sufficient to preclude summary 
judgment, at least where the claim is price fixing among 
oligopolists. Id. at 361 n.12.  
 That leaves traditional non-economic evidence of a 
conspiracy as the most important plus factor in cases like this 
one. Id. at 361. This plus factor looks for “proof that the 
defendants got together and exchanged assurances of 
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common action or otherwise adopted a common plan even 
though no meetings, conversations, or exchanged documents 
are shown.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 With these principles in mind, we now turn to whether 
the Plaintiffs have identified enough evidence to survive 
summary judgment.  
IV. 
 
 Lacking direct evidence, the Plaintiffs rely on 
circumstantial evidence to raise a reasonable inference of a 
conspiracy. The District Court found, and the parties do not 
dispute, that the Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of 
parallel pricing. Therefore, our analysis focuses on whether 
there are sufficient plus factors to defeat summary judgment.   
 A.  Motive 
 The District Court found that the Plaintiffs had 
adduced sufficient evidence of the Chocolate Manufacturers’ 
motive to enter into a price-fixing conspiracy, and again, no 
one disputes this conclusion on appeal. Given the market 
concentration and high barriers to entry, the U.S. chocolate 
confectionary market was ripe for collusion. But evidence of 
motive without more does not create a reasonable inference of 
concerted action because it merely restates interdependence. 
See Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360.  
 B. Actions Against Self-Interest 
 The District Court next held that the Plaintiffs had not 
provided enough evidence to show that the Chocolate 
Manufacturers acted contrary to their self-interest by raising 
prices in 2002, 2004, and 2007. Unlike the first plus factor, 
the parties vigorously dispute the correctness of the District 
Court’s conclusion on this point. To the Plaintiffs, the District 
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Court’s analysis is flawed, rife with inferences drawn against 
them and contradicted by their expert evidence concluding 
that cost increases could not explain the price increases. To 
the Chocolate Manufacturers, the District Court analyzed the 
issue correctly by noting the Plaintiffs’ inability to rebut the 
Chocolate Manufacturers’ several legitimate and 
procompetitive justifications for the price increases as well as 
their divergent tactics and strategies implementing the price 
increases. 
 Part of the disagreement here appears to be based on a 
misconception about what this factor means: as discussed 
above, evidence of actions against self-interest means there is 
evidence of behavior that is inconsistent with a competitive 
market. So in Flat Glass, we found this factor present based 
on the lack of evidence showing that the price increases were 
due to increases in costs or demand. See 385 F.3d at 362. 
Similarly here, the Plaintiffs’ economic experts uniformly 
opined that cost increases could not explain the price 
increases. See J.A. 5135 (Vellturo Report) (“I find that 
increased costs were a minor (if significant at all) 
consideration in Defendants’ subject price increases.”); J.A. 
13893 (Tollison Declaration) (“[C]osts provide no rational 
economic explanation for price increases . . . .”); J.A. 14058–
60 (McClave Report) (“My model shows . . . that prices were 
elevated to levels during the class period well above those 
justified by changes in cost and demand.”). Further, the 
Plaintiffs’ experts rejected criticisms that their analyses did 
not account for cost variables beyond raw material costs. 
These conclusions find at least some support from non-expert 
evidence in the record. Compare J.A. 4618–19 (October 2002 
memorandum from Hershey CEO Lenny to the Hershey 
board of directors noting “extremely sluggish retail 
environment” and explaining that Hershey would not raise 
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prices in the near term in part because Hershey was covered 
on costs), with J.A. 7654 (announcing December 2002 
Hershey price increase). Therefore, we agree with the 
Plaintiffs (and disagree with the District Court and the 
Chocolate Manufacturers) to this extent: the aforementioned 
evidence shows that the U.S. chocolate market may not have 
been acting consistently with a competitive market. 
 This is not to say that the record evidence uniformly 
supports the Plaintiffs’ position; to the contrary, there is 
substantial support for the Chocolate Manufacturers’ 
contention that their actions were consistent with, and the 
result of, competition. For example, there is evidence 
showing that the price increases were taken in anticipation of 
rising costs; that costs actually did go up during the 
conspiracy period; that the Chocolate Manufacturers tried to 
catch each other by surprise with the timing of, and the 
products associated with, the price increases; and that the 
prevalent practice of line pricing11 by retailers made it 
                                              
11 Line pricing is the practice engaged in by retailers of 
setting the same retail price for competing candy products of 
the same size. Given the practice of line pricing, the 
Chocolate Manufacturers contend that once one manufacturer 
raises list prices, it makes sense for all to follow. If a retailer 
raises the retail price on all competing candy products of a 
given size in response to one manufacturer raising list prices, 
the other manufacturers will suffer a decline in sales volume 
due to the higher retail price and lose out on any increased 
revenue unless they follow the list price increase. See J.A. 
1084; see also J.A. 1278 (Mars 2002 document explaining it 
would follow Hershey’s price increase on kings because “the 
market would move to the higher price with or without us”). 
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rational and self-interested for the Chocolate Manufacturers 
to follow price increases initiated by a rival.  
 Our conclusion is instead a recognition of the case’s 
summary judgment posture, where we must draw reasonable 
inferences in the Plaintiffs’ favor. At this stage, the 
admissible testimony from the Plaintiffs’ experts, coupled 
with other record evidence suggesting that the price increases 
were not fully explained by cost increases, does the trick. 
Although the Chocolate Manufacturers have marshaled 
considerable evidence in support of their positions, “we must 
accept that the [P]laintiffs have presented some admissible 
evidence that higher prices during the period of the alleged 
conspiracy cannot be fully explained by causes consistent 
with active competition . . . .” In re High Fructose Corn 
Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 660 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(Posner, J.).  
 But the Plaintiffs’ victory on this point is a hollow one. 
As previously noted, given this factor’s purpose of identifying 
conduct inconsistent with a competitive market, it often 
restates interdependence. Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 362 (“All 
the above indicates that the price increases were collusive, but 
not whether the collusion was merely interdependent or the 
result of an actual agreement.”). To prove a conspiracy here, 
the evidence “must go beyond mere interdependence. Parallel 
pricefixing must be so unusual that in the absence of an 
advance agreement, no reasonable firm would have engaged 
in it.” Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 135.  
 The Plaintiffs have fallen well short of this standard. 
Even if we credit the Plaintiffs’ arguments, all they show is 
that costs—which they acknowledge were increasing—did 
not justify the price increases observed in 2002, 2004, and 
2007. To the Plaintiffs’ experts, the fact that cost increases 
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couldn’t explain the price increases seems to be enough to 
show a price-fixing agreement. See J.A. 2187–88 (Vellturo 
Report) (claiming that above-competitive pricing must result 
from an express or tacit agreement); J.A. 13891–93 (Tollison 
Report) (opining that price increases taken without cost 
increases should have been defeated because other firms 
would be better off not following). But evidence of a price 
increase disconnected from changes in costs or demand only 
raises the question: was the anticompetitive price increase the 
result of lawful, rational interdependence or of an unlawful 
price-fixing conspiracy? See Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 362; 
Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1244 (“[I]t is quite likely that 
oligopolists acting independently might sell at the same 
above-marginal cost price as their competitors because the 
firms are interdependent and competitors would match any 
price cut.”); Clamp-All, 851 F.2d at 484 (“One does not need 
an agreement to bring about this kind of follow-the-leader 
effect in a concentrated industry.”). The Plaintiffs’ experts do 
not answer this question.12  
                                              
12 This case is quite different from Petruzzi’s, where 
we said the economic evidence went “a long way” in meeting 
the plaintiff’s burden. 998 F.2d at 1241. There the alleged 
conspiracy was not price fixing but instead an agreement to 
compete only on new customer accounts and not to compete 
on existing customer accounts (i.e., competition ended once a 
defendant “won” a new account). The industry (fat and bone 
rendering) was homogeneous, meaning the only basis for 
competition among the defendants was price. The economic 
evidence in Petruzzi’s showed a price differential between 
new and existing accounts (new accounts were offered a 
significantly better price than were existing accounts), which 
could only rationally be explained by an unlawful agreement. 
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 The Individual Plaintiffs acknowledge 
interdependence but persist by arguing that Hershey, in 
particular, acted against its self-interest by following Mars’s 
price increases rather than maintaining lower prices to 
increase its market share. For support, the Individual 
Plaintiffs point to Hershey’s favorable cost positions in 2002 
relative to its rivals as well as Mars’s decision not to follow 
Hershey’s 2001 price increase on packaged candy, a decision 
which led to Mars increasing its market share.  
 Deciding not to follow a price increase initiated by a 
rival is just one rational response that an oligopolist can take, 
a fact acknowledged by economists, including the Individual 
Plaintiffs’ economic expert, Dr. Vellturo. J.A. 2187 
(recognizing the “wide range of ‘competitive’ results” in 
oligopolistic markets); 6 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1429b, at 222–23 (3d ed. 2010) 
(discussing how firms in an oligopolistic market may in some 
instances choose to follow price increases while in others 
choose not to follow). That Hershey may have maintained a 
temporary cost advantage over its rivals did not make it 
irrational for Hershey to follow a price increase if it believed 
it would ultimately be better off by doing so. Indeed, the 
evidence is fully consistent with Hershey recognizing its 
temporary cost advantage but also recognizing how a price 
increase may still be to its benefit as well as the benefit of the 
chocolate industry as a whole. See J.A. 4619 (letter from 
Hershey CEO Lenny to the Hershey board explaining why 
                                                                                                     
Id. Here, by contrast, the Plaintiffs’ economic evidence is 
based on parallel price increases among oligopolists without 
corresponding cost increases, a result which, as previously 
noted, is as consistent with interdependence as with a 
conspiracy.  
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Hershey would not initiate a price increase in the near term 
but also noting that Hershey was “prepared to follow” any 
price increase initiated by a rival and adopting a “wait and 
see” strategy). This follow-the-leader strategy is especially 
reasonable in the U.S. chocolate market given the prevalent 
practice of line-pricing by retailers. Therefore, even focusing 
on Hershey and its cost advantages, the Plaintiffs cannot tell 
us whether Hershey’s decision to follow the price increase 
was due to interdependence or an unlawful agreement.  
 Moreover, focusing on Hershey’s cost advantage over 
its rivals says nothing of Mars’s and Nestlé USA’s decisions 
to raise prices. Even if Hershey’s motivations for following 
the price increase were anticompetitive, unilateral 
anticompetitive conduct is not proscribed by § 1 of the 
Sherman Act. See InterVest, 340 F.3d at 159.   
 In sum, although there is some evidence that the 
Chocolate Manufacturers acted inconsistently with a 
competitive market, the evidence does not go beyond 
interdependence and therefore does not create an inference of 
a conspiracy. 
 C.  Traditional Conspiracy Evidence 
 We now consider the most important plus factor in this 
case: whether there is enough traditional conspiracy evidence 
to create a reasonable inference that the Chocolate 
Manufacturers conspired to fix prices. The Plaintiffs identify 
several categories of traditional conspiracy evidence, but the 
most important is evidence of the contemporaneous Canadian 
conspiracy. We therefore discuss the Canadian conspiracy 
evidence first, followed by the Plaintiffs’ other traditional 
conspiracy evidence.  
  1. The contemporaneous Canadian 
conspiracy 
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 The Individual Plaintiffs and the Direct Purchaser 
Class do not ascribe the same meaning to the Canadian 
conspiracy evidence. According to the Individual Plaintiffs, it 
is reasonable to infer a domestic conspiracy from the 
evidence of a Canadian conspiracy based on the fact that the 
Canadian market is a similar adjacent market involving the 
same participants. The Individual Plaintiffs further contend 
that a jury should be permitted to weigh evidence of the 
Canadian conspiracy in assessing the credibility of the 
Chocolate Manufacturers’ explanations for the U.S. price 
increases. Finally, the Individual Plaintiffs argue, based on 
testimony from their economic expert, that the Canadian 
conspiracy “actuated” or facilitated the U.S. conspiracy. 
According to Dr. Vellturo’s actuation theory, the sharing of 
information between the Chocolate Manufacturers and their 
Canadian counterparts led the Chocolate Manufacturers to 
observe the success of the Canadian conspiracy and 
implement a tacit or express U.S. conspiracy. See J.A. 2191–
92. On appeal, the Direct Purchaser Class distances itself 
from the actuation theory, arguing instead that the Canadian 
conspiracy is relevant to assessing the Chocolate 
Manufacturers’ conduct because it enhances the plausibility 
of a domestic conspiracy.  
 We have not considered what inferences may be 
permissibly drawn from evidence of a foreign antitrust 
conspiracy about the existence of a domestic antitrust 
conspiracy. The Areeda treatise guides our analysis, and we 
quote from it at length: 
Illegal behavior elsewhere in time or place does not 
generally allow the inference of an immediate 
conspiracy. If the immediately challenged behavior 
would not imply a conspiracy among firms that are 
similar to the defendants [but that are not involved in a 
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conspiracy elsewhere], then a distinct conspiracy in the 
past or in a different market has little power to explain 
the present behavior. But if there is other evidence of a 
present conspiracy, the defendants’ sins elsewhere may 
cast doubt on the truthfulness of their innocent 
explanations.  
 
Of course, the scope of a proved conspiracy will often 
be uncertain. It may be difficult to define the 
boundaries of a conspiracy proved to cover an adjacent 
time period, product, or region. Competitors who were 
conspiring in this market yesterday may still be doing 
so today. Parties who are conspiring in New York may 
be doing the same in New Jersey.  
 
If immediate parallelism is as likely to result from 
present interdependence as from proved conspiracy in 
the past, we should not lightly assume in fact or 
presume in law that the earlier conspiracy continues. 
Contemporaneous conspiracies in adjacent geographic 
markets could reasonably be deemed sufficient to 
transfer to the defendants at least the burden of going 
forward with evidence of an explanation that 
performance is different in the second market, that any 
motivation for conspiracy in one market does not 
extend to the other, or that the personnel or other 
circumstances make it unreasonable to interpret the 
proved conspiracy as extending to the adjacent market.  
 
Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 1421a, at 160.   
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 The Second and Eleventh Circuits have taken positions 
consistent with the Areeda treatise. In In re Elevator Antitrust 
Litigation, 502 F.3d 47, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam), 
the Second Circuit concluded that a claim of a domestic or 
worldwide conspiracy in the elevator and elevator services 
markets was unsupported by allegations of a conspiracy in the 
European elevator market given the absence of “any evidence 
of linkage between” the foreign and domestic conduct. 
Without such a link, the plaintiffs’ argument was merely “‘if 
it happened there, it could have happened here.’” Id. at 52. 
Similarly, in Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 
F.3d 1287, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2003), the Eleventh Circuit 
held that a district court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding evidence of contemporaneous foreign conspiracies 
involving cigarette manufacturers that were also charged with 
a domestic antitrust conspiracy. The court reasoned that 
without “some palpable tie between these overseas activities 
and [the manufacturers’] pricing actions in the United States, 
the foreign undertakings . . . do not tend to exclude the 
possibility of independent action in the setting of domestic 
cigarette prices.” Id. at 1317.   
 We are persuaded by the sensible approach articulated 
by the Areeda treatise and inherent in the reasoning of the 
courts in Elevator and Williamson Oil. A conspiracy 
elsewhere, without more, generally does not tend to prove a 
domestic conspiracy, especially when the conduct observed 
domestically is just as consistent with lawful interdependence 
as with an antitrust conspiracy. To hold otherwise would 
sanction the use of unabashed propensity reasoning—the 
fallacy that “if it happened there, it could have happened 
here”—to prove a domestic conspiracy using evidence of a 
foreign conspiracy. But if two markets are sufficiently similar 
or adjacent and the relevant activities therein are sufficiently 
  33 
 
linked or tied in some way, e.g., the people involved in the 
conspiracies are the same or overlapping, it may be 
reasonable to use evidence of a foreign conspiracy to support 
an inference of a domestic conspiracy.13  
 Based on our review of the record, we conclude that 
the Plaintiffs have not adequately linked the Canadian 
conspiracy to the purported U.S. conspiracy to justify using 
the former to support an inference of the latter. First, the 
people involved in the Canadian conspiracy are different from 
those involved in the purported U.S. conspiracy. Granted, 
Mars Canada and Hershey Canada are subsidiaries whose 
executives report to and receive final approval from U.S. 
executives on certain decisions, including pricing decisions. 
                                              
13 Our decision in Flat Glass is not to the contrary. 
There we noted in dicta that evidence of a defendant’s price 
fixing in a market for original equipment manufacturer glass 
would be relevant to the claim that the same defendant also 
conspired to fix prices in the market for flat glass, a closely 
related but distinct product market in the same geographic 
area. See 385 F.3d at 377–78. The evidence in Flat Glass 
involved identical companies and one executive who 
participated in the price-fixing conspiracies in both product 
markets. It is therefore consistent with the rule stated above 
because the people and companies involved in both 
conspiracies overlapped.   
Nor does the standard we adopt here conflict with 
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 
U.S. 690 (1962). Continental Ore is inapposite because the 
relevant foreign conduct in that case was part of a single 
conspiracy that “was effectuated both here and abroad,” id. at 
706, and the Plaintiffs do not contend a single conspiracy 
existed here. 
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But the evidence does not show that any U.S. executives were 
involved in the Canadian trade spend or price-fixing 
conspiracies. The evidence instead shows that the 
conspiratorial conduct occurred in Canada when Canadian 
executives and ITWAL agreed to limit trade spend or raise 
prices in concert, not when they received final approval from 
U.S. executives on price changes. And as for Nestlé USA, the 
case is stronger yet. Nestlé Canada is not a subsidiary of 
Nestlé USA, and Nestlé Canada’s pricing decisions did not 
need Nestlé USA’s approval.  
 Second, although the Canadian and U.S. markets are in 
a sense adjacent, they are not adjacent in the same way that 
the New York and New Jersey markets are, to use the 
example from the Areeda treatise. The Canadian Chocolate 
Manufacturers are distinct legal entities operating in a 
different country, and their wrongdoing does not tend to show 
that the Chocolate Manufacturers engaged in similar 
wrongdoing in the United States. Cf. Ins. Brokerage, 618 F.3d 
at 341 n.44 (“[A] subsidiary is a distinct legal entity and is not 
liable for the actions of its parent or sister corporations simply 
by dint of the corporate relationship.”).  
 Third, the circumstances surrounding the Canadian 
conspiracy are markedly different from the purported U.S. 
conspiracy, and comparing the two reveals gaping holes in 
the Plaintiffs’ proof in this case. In Canada, ITWAL played a 
primary role in instigating, organizing, and facilitating the 
Canadian conspiracy; the Plaintiffs here identify no similar 
U.S. player. In Canada, the conspiracy involved concerted 
action on trade spend in addition to price fixing; the purported 
U.S. conspiracy only involved price fixing. In Canada, the 
Canadian Chocolate Manufacturers’ most senior executives 
exchanged pricing information and agreed to fix prices, see, 
e.g., J.A. 14106 (describing a November 22, 2007, telephone 
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call between a Nestlé Canada executive and a Hershey 
Canada executive in which the Hershey Canada executive 
promised that Hershey Canada would follow a Nestlé Canada 
price increase); J.A. 11817–18 (Sculthorpe of Cadbury 
Canada testifying to a meeting with Leonidas of Nestlé 
Canada where Leonidas said Nestlé Canada was raising 
prices and Sculthorpe said Cadbury Canada would follow); 
the Plaintiffs here can point to hardly any communications, 
let alone pricing communications, among the Chocolate 
Manufacturers’ U.S. executives. And in Canada, Cadbury 
Canada’s cooperation with the Canadian Competition 
Bureau’s investigation yielded evidence of conspiratorial 
conduct in Canada; Cadbury’s settlement with the Plaintiffs 
here required cooperation as a condition of the settlement, but 
despite that cooperation, no similar evidence was uncovered 
in the United States.  
 As to the actuation theory, we reject its application 
here for the reasons stated by the District Court.14 The 
actuation theory posits that conspiratorial “conduct and 
outcomes” in Canada facilitated an unlawful U.S. conspiracy. 
                                              
14 We have doubts about the actuation theory and 
whether it unduly blurs an already fine line between lawful 
interdependence and unlawful conspiracies, especially when 
the alleged conspiracy involves price fixing among 
oligopolists supposedly formed by a tacit agreement. “[E]ven 
when each firm rests its own [pricing] decision upon its belief 
that competitors will do the same,” that only shows 
interdependence, not a conspiracy. Clamp-All, 851 F.2d at 
484. But because the District Court concluded that Dr. 
Vellturo’s theory was admissible and the Chocolate 
Manufacturers do not challenge that decision on appeal, we 
reject the theory’s application on its own terms.  
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J.A. 2192. The theory therefore presumes a factual 
foundation, namely that the U.S. decision makers knew of the 
unlawful conduct in Canada and their knowledge of that 
conduct gave them confidence to raise U.S. prices by a tacit 
or express agreement. See J.A. 2186 (concluding that the U.S. 
price increases were the result “of collusion (either tacit or 
express) that was actuated as a result of information and 
confidence collected by [the Chocolate Manufacturers] on the 
development, execution and conduct of conspiratorial action 
among their Canadian operations”).15  
                                              
15 Dr. Vellturo’s explanation of the actuation theory in 
his report drives home the point. There he opines that before 
2002, the Chocolate Manufacturers were unable to raise 
prices together. Posing a thought experiment, he says to 
“consider a scenario in which U.S. executives from each 
Defendant with pricing authority for both the U.S. and 
Canada fly to a meeting in Canada” and “[w]ithout ever 
uttering an express word regarding U.S. prices, the three 
executives agree to raise prices in Canada by 10%.” J.A. 
2193. The thought experiment continues with the executives 
returning to the U.S. and monitoring the Canadian outcomes, 
and then, without any further communication, one firm 
announces a price increase of 10% in the U.S. Dr. Vellturo 
opines that under these circumstances, the “coordinated anti-
competitive agreement in Canada has significantly changed 
the information known about likely responses to a price 
increase in the U.S. by these same companies,” with the price 
leader expecting the other companies to follow the price 
increase. J.A. 2194. This thought experiment presumes not 
only that the conspirators in the U.S. knew of the Canadian 
conspiracy but also that the U.S. conspirators are the same 
people as the Canadian conspirators.  
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 And for good reason. Unless there is direct or 
circumstantial evidence showing that the U.S. Chocolate 
Manufacturers knew of the unlawful Canadian conspiracy, 
the U.S. Chocolate Manufacturers would have no basis to 
know whether the Canadian parallel trade spend reductions 
and pricing were the result of a conspiracy or 
interdependence. If we inferred the existence of a U.S. 
conspiracy based on evidence that only shows that U.S. 
                                                                                                     
Moreover, at oral argument, counsel for the Individual 
Plaintiffs clearly explained that Dr. Vellturo premised his 
theory on evidence showing “that the U.S. executives with 
pricing authority at a minimum knew that there was a [sic] 
joint conduct in Canada, [and] at a maximum directed that it 
occur.” Oral Argument at 25:38, available at http://www2. 
ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/14-
2790InReChocolateConfectionaryAntitrust.mp3. 
That being said, Dr. Vellturo backtracked in his 
deposition by asserting that the U.S. Chocolate 
Manufacturers’ awareness of the Canadian conspiracy was 
“not essential to [his] opinion.” J.A. 2529. In that case, we 
acknowledge that the factual prerequisites for this variation of 
the actuation theory—that the Chocolate Manufacturers 
monitored Canadian prices and communicated (lawfully) with 
their Canadian affiliates—are satisfied. But under this variant 
theory, the inference of a U.S. conspiracy is tenuous because 
the U.S. result of parallel pricing is perfectly consistent with 
interdependence. See Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 1422b, 
at 170 (noting that facilitating devices alone do not imply a 
traditional conspiracy because “any parallelism in subsequent 
behavior will often be of the sort that can be satisfactorily 
explained by oligopolistic interdependence alone and without 
regard to the facilitating practice”). 
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executives observed the parallel outcomes in Canada but had 
no knowledge of the cause of those outcomes (a conspiracy or 
interdependence), we would chill lawful conduct. We would 
essentially prohibit an oligopolist from recognizing its 
interdependence in a foreign market and applying those 
lessons in a domestic market, even though interdependence at 
home or abroad is lawful under the Sherman Act. If 
interdependence alone is not unlawful, we fail to see how 
evidence that effectively shows “interdependence squared” 
suddenly would create a reasonable inference of a U.S. 
conspiracy. Therefore, for the actuation theory to make a 
meaningful dent in the Plaintiffs’ burden, they must show 
more than similar outcomes in Canada and the United States; 
they must instead show that the unlawful Canadian conduct 
actuated, facilitated, or informed the U.S. conduct.16  
 The District Court correctly found factual support for 
the actuation theory lacking in this case, either in the form of 
the U.S. Chocolate Manufacturers’ direct participation in or 
knowledge of the Canadian conspiracy. First, the theory finds 
no support in a 2007 email from Humberto Alfonso, a U.S.-
based Hershey executive, connecting Eric Lent, the new 
General Manager of Hershey Canada, with Schulthorpe, 
Cadbury Canada’s President. In the email, Alfonso wrote, “In 
keeping with the good advice from ‘The Godfather,’ keep 
close to your competition.” J.A. 8380. Because Alfonso 
participated in the 2007 U.S. pricing decision, and perhaps 
also because he appears to have referenced the sinister words 
                                              
16 To the extent Dr. Vellturo’s opinion is based only on 
similar outcomes, see supra note 15, it is insufficient on its 
own to create a reasonable inference of a conspiracy. 
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of Michael Corleone from The Godfather Part II,17 the Direct 
Purchaser Class wants us to infer something more sinister 
from this social introduction—that Alfonso encouraged or 
facilitated the Canadian conspiracy. But social contacts 
between competitors without more are not unlawful. See Baby 
Food, 166 F.3d at 133. Without anything else to suggest 
Alfonso’s further involvement in the Canadian conspiracy, 
and with Alfonso’s sworn declaration that he sent the email 
only as a social introduction and lacked knowledge of the 
Canadian conspiracy, see J.A. 12996–97, we cannot read this 
email as anything other than a social introduction. 
 Nor does Leonidas, CEO of Nestlé Canada, establish 
the necessary link between the Canadian and U.S. markets. 
According to the Plaintiffs, Leonidas played a key role in the 
Canadian conspiracy and regularly interacted with U.S. 
executives, including with Nestlé USA’s team when Nestlé 
considered buying Hershey in 2002. But this purported 
common player did not have pricing authority for the U.S. 
market and none of Leonidas’s documented communications 
with U.S. executives hinted at illegal conduct in Canada, 
leaving a significant gap in the inferences the Plaintiffs ask us 
to draw to connect the two conspiracies.  
 A set of emails from Hershey Canada executives to 
Hershey executives in the U.S. is also not enough. In 2003, 
Bruce Brown, Hershey Canada’s General Manager, emailed 
Burt Snyder, the Interim President of Hershey International, 
shortly after Nestlé Canada initiated a price increase. 
Speaking of the Canadian market, Brown said he had “some 
intelligence” that “[Mars] is anxious to follow [Nestlé’s] price 
                                              
17 “My father taught me . . . keep your friends close, 
but your enemies closer.” The Godfather Part II (Paramount 
Pictures 1974). 
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increase but would rather have Hershey or Cadbury announce 
ahead of them.” J.A. 7174. Brown went on to call Cadbury 
“the wild card” because he had heard rumors of Cadbury 
taking a price increase but also of Cadbury offering deep 
discounts to certain stores. Id. Snyder responded by 
approving the proposed price increase. In 2005, Brown 
emailed J.P. Bilbrey, the President of Hershey International, 
to say Brown “had heard rumours swirling around about a 
potential competitive price increase (Nestl[é]/Cadbury) in 
Canada . . . and had it confirmed last week, although details 
are sketchy.” J.A. 8316. And in October 2007, following a 
meeting between Hershey Canada General Manager Lent and 
Leonidas where Leonidas told Lent that Nestlé Canada would 
be increasing prices, J.A. 11941, an email circulated among 
Hershey executives in the U.S., noting that “[Lent] knows 
Nestl[é]’s [p]ricing in Canada, and hears [Mars/Cadbury] 
following,” and that Cadbury Canada and Nestlé Canada had 
“floated” price increases. J.A. 8421–22. The October 2007 
emails, however, made no reference to the meeting between 
Lent and Leonidas. 
 Even assuming the Plaintiffs are correct that an 
inference could be drawn from these emails that some 
Hershey executives in the United States were aware of the 
Canadian conspiracy (an inference better supported by some 
emails than others), that is all they show; they say nothing 
about what Mars and Nestlé USA knew. Indeed, the record is 
devoid of evidence showing that Mars and Nestlé USA knew 
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of the Canadian conspiracy.18 Even if the Canadian 
conspiracy informed Hershey’s unilateral actions, it could not 
have facilitated a U.S. conspiracy if two of the three 
purported conspirators (including Mars, the price leader in all 
three instances) were unaware of the Canadian conspiracy. 
 In sum, under any of the theories presented by the 
Plaintiffs, there must be a sufficient factual basis for the 
Canadian conspiracy to be relevant to or facilitative of the 
purported U.S. conspiracy. Because such evidence is lacking, 
                                              
18 A September 2005 email from Don Robinson, 
President of Mars Canada, to Robert Gamgort, President of 
Mars North America, does not show that Mars executives in 
the U.S. knew of the Canadian conspiracy. In that email, 
Robinson said that “an industry wide price increase has been 
rumoured for a few weeks” and reported the price increases 
already taken and being taken by Mars Canada’s competitors. 
J.A. 1395. Unlike the aforementioned 2003 Brown to Snyder 
email, for example (which suggested that Hershey Canada 
contemplated a coordinated response to a Nestlé Canada price 
increase with its rivals), this Mars email does not include 
information that tends to show a Canadian conspiracy.  
Nor does a March 2002 email from Frank Higgins, 
Vice President of Marketing for Nestlé USA, to other Nestlé 
USA executives show that Nestlé USA knew of the ongoing 
Canadian conspiracy. In that email, Higgins reported on a 
Hershey Canada price increase and promised he would “get[] 
more information from Nestl[é] Canada to assess the 
likelihood that they will increase prices in the US.” J.A. 7394. 
This email shows that Nestlé USA monitored outcomes in 
Canada but says nothing of whether Nestlé USA knew the 
price increases there were the result of interdependence or a 
conspiracy.  
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the contemporaneous Canadian conspiracy does not support a 
reasonable inference of a U.S. conspiracy, and we move on to 
consider other traditional conspiracy evidence. 
  2. Possession of advance pricing 
information 
 The Plaintiffs also highlight evidence that they argue 
shows that the Chocolate Manufacturers exchanged pricing 
information before they publicly announced the price 
increases. Specifically, the Plaintiffs point to an internal 
Hershey document from 2002 reflecting that Hershey knew as 
early as September 2002 that “Mars [wa]s considering a price 
increase due to rising cocoa costs,” J.A. 5300, even though 
Mars did not publicly announce a price increase until 
December. According to the Direct Purchaser Class, only a 
small group of Mars senior executives knew about the 
planned price increase in September, and Hershey reacted by 
changing its internal pricing system in anticipation of a price 
increase, both of which, the Direct Purchaser Class argues, 
support an inference that the information was more than 
rumor and came from Mars executives. Hershey insists that it 
did not obtain the information from Mars, citing an internal 
pricing presentation from October 2002 stating that “[third] 
party cocoa suppliers believe Mars will soon take a price 
increase.” J.A. 4606. That Hershey had advance warning of 
Mars’s price increase is further supported, the Plaintiffs 
contend, by a memo from Hershey CEO Lenny to the 
Hershey board stating that the Mars 2002 price increase was 
“roughly in line with expectations,” J.A. 4620. 
 Additionally, the Direct Purchaser Class points to a 
2004 Hershey memo, again from Lenny to the Hershey board, 
stating that Hershey “received confirmation that both Mars 
and Nestl[é] have also raised their prices on loose bars.” J.A. 
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5276. Lenny’s statement came two days before Nestlé USA 
publicly announced its price increase. According to the 
Hershey vice president who passed the information about 
Nestlé USA’s price increase on to Lenny, the information 
came from a customer, not Nestlé USA. See J.A. 12999.  
 The “mere possession of competitive memoranda” is 
not evidence of concerted action to fix prices. Baby Food, 
166 F.3d at 126. In Baby Food, the plaintiffs also relied on 
the defendants’ possession of documents that contained 
competitor pricing information in advance of any public 
announcements. Low-level employees gathered some of the 
information, but the defendants provided no explanation as to 
how they obtained other information. Still, we decided that 
this evidence did not support the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim. 
Id. For information that came from low-level employees, we 
viewed it as less worrisome than if it had come from upper-
level executives. Id. at 125–26 & n.8. We also insisted on 
proof that such information “had an impact on pricing 
decisions.” Id. at 125. Even for the advance information from 
unexplained sources, we noted that “it makes common sense 
to obtain as much information as possible of the pricing 
policies and marketing strategies of one’s competitors.” Id. at 
126. 
 In Flat Glass, we distinguished Baby Food and held 
that the evidence showing possession of advance pricing 
information supported an inference of conspiracy. The 
evidence in Flat Glass showed that the information 
exchanges occurred among the conspiring companies’ upper 
ranks and that the exchanges affected prices. See 385 F.3d at 
369 (citing example of a fax from one competitor to another 
revealing the sender’s planned price increase and noting that 
the fax recipient announced an identical price increase before 
the fax sender). We summarized the evidence: 
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[H]ere the exchanges of information are more tightly 
linked with concerted behavior and therefore they 
appear more purposive. Several of the key documents 
emphasize that the relevant price increases were not 
economically justified or supportable, but required 
competitors to hold the line. Others suggest not just 
foreknowledge of a single competitor’s pricing plans, 
but of the plans of multiple competitors. Predictions of 
price behavior were followed by actual price changes. 
The inference of concerted rather than interdependent 
action is therefore stronger. 
 
Id.  
 On the spectrum of advance pricing evidence, the 
Plaintiff’s evidence here is much closer to the evidence in 
Baby Food than to the evidence in Flat Glass. The Plaintiffs 
have no direct or strong circumstantial evidence that the 
information came from Hershey’s competitors, much less 
their upper-level executives. The information is also limited 
to advance pricing information and, unlike in Flat Glass, does 
not reveal pricing plans dependent on others following. 
Furthermore, the two-day notice of Nestlé USA’s 2004 price 
increase came after Hershey had already announced its price 
increase, so it is hard to say it affected Hershey’s pricing 
decision. Finally, the record shows that the Chocolate 
Manufacturers’ pricing actions were intended to, and in some 
cases did, catch their rivals by surprise. See J.A. 1261 (Mars 
2002 internal document explaining how Mars leading a price 
increase could “disrupt[] distracted competition”); J.A. 3641 
(Hershey 2004 email from David West stating he was 
“[a]ngry at [him]self” that Hershey did not anticipate Mars’s 
2004 price increase on packaged products); J.A. 5274 (Mars 
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2007 email from Gamgort praising Mars’s 2007 price 
increase as brilliantly timed because it “caught [Hershey] and 
[Nestlé USA] totally by surprise”).  
 In sum, gathering the price information of competitors 
can be just as consistent with lawful interdependence as with 
a price-fixing conspiracy. See Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 126. 
The evidence summarized above does not support an 
inference of a conspiracy.  
  3. Opportunity and improper 
communications 
 The Plaintiffs also contend that the Chocolate 
Manufacturers had opportunities to conspire during the 
proposed sale of Hershey and at trade show meetings. The 
Plaintiffs’ evidence is essentially that the executives from the 
Chocolate Manufacturers were in the same place at the same 
time, which is insufficient to support a reasonable inference 
of concerted activity. See Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1235. Even 
if we assume that Nestlé USA learned of Hershey’s 
commodities cost coverage during the 2002 sale process 
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(which is far from clear),19 there is nothing to suggest that 
Hershey and Nestlé USA used the sale process to hatch a 
price-fixing conspiracy, especially because Mars, the price 
leader in 2002, was uninvolved in the sale process. This 
evidence of mere opportunities to conspire stands in stark 
contrast to the evidence of secret meetings and 
communications in the Canadian conspiracy and cannot alone 
support an inference of a conspiracy. 
 Relatedly, the Direct Purchaser Class argues that there 
is evidence of improper communications among the 
Chocolate Manufacturers’ employees and that these 
communications support an inference of a conspiracy. The 
Class cites (1) a 2004 email between Nestlé USA managers 
showing that a Hershey employee had given a Nestlé USA 
employee information about Hershey’s pricing promotions on 
multipack products, J.A. 9270; (2) a January 2007 email 
between two Mars sales executives about a conversation with 
a Hershey manager and information learned about Hershey’s 
                                              
19 Compare J.A. 7105 (2002 Hershey internal 
document explaining that “the bidders conducted extensive 
due diligence reviews and were provided with additional 
information as requested (in some instances for competitive 
and regulatory reasons only certain non-operational personnel 
of potential bidders were provided information)”), and J.A. 
13295–96 (Direct Purchaser Class’s expert acknowledging 
the complete lack of record evidence showing that either 
Nestlé S.A. or Nestlé USA received information about 
Hershey’s commodities cost coverage), with J.A. 12843–45 
(Cadbury officer acknowledging that Cadbury received 
information about Hershey’s commodities cost coverage in an 
email from an investment banker working for Hershey during 
the sale process). 
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promotional activities, J.A. 9269; and (3) a September 2007 
email between Mars executives relaying that one had 
obtained information about costs from his counterpart at 
Hershey, J.A. 9267. These sporadic communications among 
individuals without pricing authority are insufficient to create 
a reasonable inference of a conspiracy. See Baby Food, 166 
F.3d at 125. Moreover, the September 2007 communication 
occurred after the 2007 price increase, so it could not have 
affected the relevant pricing decisions. Accordingly, we will 
not infer a conspiracy from this evidence.  
  4. Departure from pre-conspiracy 
conduct  
  The Plaintiffs argue further that the Chocolate 
Manufacturers departed from their pre-conspiracy conduct by 
deciding to follow price increases during the conspiracy 
period and that this is traditional conspiracy evidence. For a 
change in conduct to create an inference of a conspiracy, the 
shift in behavior must be a “radical” or “abrupt” change from 
the industry’s business practices. Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 
221 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2000). The Plaintiffs have failed 
to show such a shift here. 
 First, the Plaintiffs’ argument is not premised on an 
apples-to-apples comparison. To show a shift in conduct, the 
Plaintiffs rely on a “failed” September 2001 price increase on 
packaged candy initiated by Hershey. Instead of following the 
price increase, Mars responded by reducing its weight on 
M&M packaged candy and maintaining prices, but three 
months later, Mars raised prices on miniatures packaged 
chocolate candy. J.A. 6192–93. The Plaintiffs also cite a 
January 2002 proposed price increase by Hershey on certain 
boxed chocolates that Hershey rescinded when it received 
pushback from customers. By contrast, the 2002 and 2007 
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parallel price increases involved only singles and kings, and 
the 2004 parallel price increases involved singles and kings as 
well as packaged candy. In fact, the Chocolate Manufacturers 
did not exactly follow each other on packaged products in the 
2002 price increases, lending further support to the notion 
that different considerations factored into the pricing 
decisions for immediate consumption products and future 
consumption products. Putting aside the fact that Mars 
actually responded to Hershey’s 2001 price increase and did 
not simply stand pat, the “failed” price increases in 2001 and 
early 2002 involved different products at different times than 
the parallel price increases in 2002, 2004, and 2007.  
 Second, the focus of the Plaintiffs’ argument is unduly 
narrow. Historically, parallel pricing in the U.S. chocolate 
market has not been at all uncommon. See J.A. 1087 
(detailing parallel pricing in 1981 and 1983); J.A. 1105–06 
(detailing a 1979 weight reduction on singles initiated by 
Hershey and matched by Mars; a 1986 price increase on 
singles, kings, and six packs initiated by Mars and matched 
by Hershey; a 1991 price increase on singles, kings, and six 
packs initiated by Hershey and matched by Mars; and a 1995 
price increase on singles, kings, and six packs initiated by 
Hershey and matched by Mars and Nestlé USA). Moreover, 
after the alleged conspiracy period, the Chocolate 
Manufacturers have raised prices in parallel three other times. 
J.A. 2866–67. The Plaintiffs do not argue that all of these 
parallel price increases resulted from an unlawful conspiracy, 
so we fail to see why we should infer a conspiracy existed 
between 2002 and 2007 from behavior that is in fact 
consistent with how this industry has historically operated.  
 Third, it is generally unremarkable for the pendulum in 
oligopolistic markets to swing from less to more 
interdependent and cooperative. See Areeda & Hovenkamp, 
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supra, ¶ 1431a, at 229 (noting that the degree of 
interdependence “may be either weak or strong and may vary 
from time to time within a given market”). 
 Accordingly, the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs 
does not show an abrupt shift in behavior that can support a 
reasonable inference of a conspiracy.  
  5. Pretextual explanations for price 
increases 
 Finally, we address the Plaintiffs’ argument that the 
Chocolate Manufacturers’ pretextual explanations for their 
price increases support a reasonable inference of a 
conspiracy. See Fragale & Sons Beverage Co. v. Dill, 760 
F.2d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 1985) (recognizing that pretextual 
explanations for disputed conduct “would disprove the 
likelihood of independent action”). The Chocolate 
Manufacturers publicly explained their price increases by 
citing rising costs. The Plaintiffs contend these cost-based 
explanations were cover for the real reason—to advance a 
price-fixing conspiracy.  
 The same evidence that we credited earlier as showing 
that cost increases did not justify the price increases does not 
necessarily show pretext, i.e., that the Chocolate 
Manufacturers lied when they gave their cost-based 
explanations for their price increases. The Plaintiffs 
acknowledge that raw materials costs went up during this 
period; they simply dispute whether the increases were 
enough to justify the price increases. See J.A. 13892 (Tollison 
Report) (acknowledging that “cocoa prices did rise during the 
class period”); J.A. 6273–74 (same). Nor do the Plaintiffs 
dispute that other input costs, such as labor and energy costs, 
increased during this period.  
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 Moreover, contemporaneous internal documents show 
that some who worked for the Chocolate Manufacturers were 
concerned about cost increases during the conspiracy period. 
See, e.g., J.A. 1031 (Nestlé USA 2002 internal document 
suggesting budget revisions “due to increased cocoa prices”); 
J.A. 1261 (Mars 2002 internal document proposing price 
increase in December 2002 in part because of “emerging 
material cost pressures” and because of belief that “all” the 
Chocolate Manufacturers “will likely face significant cost 
pressures in 2003”); J.A. 7649 (September 2002 email from 
Hershey’s David West noting “organizational momentum 
around pricing behind commodity prices,” but expressing 
disagreement with that organizational view); J.A. 1114 (citing 
March 2003 Hershey annual report that expressed concern 
about cocoa costs going up in 2004). But see, e.g., J.A. 4619 
(October 2002 report from Hershey CEO Lenny to the 
Hershey board explaining cost coverage on cocoa through 
2004); J.A. 7906 (December 2004 email from Hershey CEO 
Lenny discussing how to publicly explain the 2004 price 
increase given Hershey’s “outspoken[ness] about [Hershey’s] 
‘coverage’ on cocoa and to a lesser extent on all input costs”). 
Therefore, to the extent the Plaintiffs’ pretext argument is that 
costs were going up but not enough to justify a price increase, 
their showing of pretext is weak. 
 But even if the evidence of pretext were stronger, it 
would still be insufficient to survive summary judgment 
because pretext alone does not create a reasonable inference 
of a conspiracy. See Miles Distribs., Inc. v. Specialty Constr. 
Brands, Inc., 476 F.3d 442, 452 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e hold 
that [pretextual reasons] are insufficient to create a genuine 
issue of fact without other evidence pointing to a price-fixing 
agreement.”); DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills 
Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1514 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing 
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Fragale, 760 F.2d at 474) (same); H. L. Moore Drug Exch. v. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 662 F.2d 935, 941 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[T]he 
mere fact that a business reason advanced by a defendant for 
its [action] is undermined does not, by itself, justify the 
inference that the conduct was therefore the result of a 
conspiracy.”).  
 Requiring something more than pretext to survive 
summary judgment makes particular sense in cases like this 
one. In their pretext argument, the Plaintiffs rely on the same 
evidence they did in arguing that the Chocolate 
Manufacturers acted contrary to their interests—evidence 
which we have already said is insufficient to defeat summary 
judgment. That evidence is also insufficient here. That rising 
costs may not have been the full or even real reason for 
increasing prices does not show whether the real reason was 
interdependence or a conspiracy. Therefore, allegations of 
pretext must be accompanied by other traditional conspiracy 
evidence or economic evidence to create a reasonable 
inference of a conspiracy. Because such other evidence is 
lacking here, any evidence of pretext is insufficient to 
preclude summary judgment.  
 D. Summary of the Evidence as a Whole 
 Considering the evidence as a whole, the Plaintiffs 
have failed to create a reasonable inference that the Chocolate 
Manufacturers more likely than not conspired to fix prices in 
the U.S. chocolate market. Compared to other cases where we 
decided that summary judgment should not have been 
granted, the Plaintiffs’ case here is relatively weak. Cf. Flat 
Glass, 385 F.3d at 369 (reversing summary judgment for the 
defendants based in part on evidence about price increases 
that required cooperation of competitors and coordinated 
price increases suspiciously close in time to meetings and 
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communications involving the conspirators); Petruzzi’s, 998 
F.2d at 1234–37 (reversing summary judgment for the 
defendants based on witness testimony about a “code” among 
the defendants not to compete on existing accounts and about 
discussions of price fixing at trade association meetings; 
taped conversations in which a conspirator told another 
company to “play by the rules”; and economic evidence 
showing that the only rational explanation for the price data 
was an unlawful conspiracy).  
 Evidence of a disconnected foreign conspiracy, limited 
possession of advance pricing information, mere 
opportunities to conspire without suspect meetings or 
conversations about pricing, conduct that is consistent with 
pre-conspiracy conduct, and a weak showing of pretext do not 
support a reasonable inference of a conspiracy. Granted, we 
held that some of this evidence individually was insufficient 
“without more,” but taken together, the aforementioned 
evidence does not provide the necessary “more” to survive 
summary judgment. In short, all of this evidence is as 
consistent with interdependence as with a conspiracy, and as 
such, it does not tend to exclude the possibility that the 
Chocolate Manufacturers acted lawfully.  
 Although our analysis does not exactly mirror the 
District Court’s, we agree with the District Court’s 
conclusion: the evidence in this case calls for summary 
judgment in favor of the Chocolate Manufacturers.  
V. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s summary judgment. 
